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Abstract
This thesis examines household characteristics as determinants of formal savings
accounts in rural Malawi. The main questions answered in this paper include the effects
of household characteristics on the probability of having formal savings, the amounts
saved in these accounts, and the probability of adopting formal savings. The central
discussion aims to identify the initial adopters of formal savings accounts, using a
marketing approach previously unapplied to this area of research. This paper also
contributes to the dialogue of the household composition by considering three untried
variables: number of adults, number of children, and literacy of all household members.
Results show that households are most likely to adopt formal savings, when provided
access, if they have a head who can read Chichewa, a functional cellphone, more adults
who can read Chichewa, and are close to the bank service. The field evidence comes
from research conducted over a two year period 2008-2010 in sampled regions of Central
Malawi.
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I. Introduction

Traditionally, the term “microfinance” mostly referred to microcredit, but
recently, researchers and practitioners are starting to see the benefits of microsavings as well.
Introducing formal services of microsavings is an under-studied (yet, well questioned) method
that adds liquidity to stagnant economies. Those who support such services focus on
empowering the poor to escape poverty traps, and those who question these services often
highlight the ethical issues that come with the pressures of transaction costs. Call it a manmade lake in a desert of poverty, or a pacemaker to the heartbeat of markets, microsavings has
become a popular approach in efforts to alleviate poverty.
Microsavings, in particular, may prove to be an effective tool to suppress poverty
because studies have shown that the poor want to save. In a study on access to financial
services in Nepal, Prina (2013) found that even though the poor wanted to save, their demand
for savings accounts was unmet. Her study revealed that when administrator and withdrawal
fees were excluded, 84% of the sampled households opened formal savings accounts, all of
which did not crowd out savings in other informal institutions.
It might be the case that a poor household demands access to formal savings, but
is unable to adopt or regularly use the service due to conditions within the household. For
example, if the fees for using formal accounts were not excluded in Prina’s study (2013), the
take up of formal savings might have been lower than expected due to a household’s budget
constraint, size, etc. That said, I believe that financial institutions can leverage the untapped
demand for formal savings effectively by understanding how household characteristics may
affect their decision to opt for formal savings accounts. Let us review some important
1

findings that deal with household characteristics of the poor.
The existing literature that looks at household determinants of financial services
usage suggests that the reach and success of microsavings programs can be accelerated with
improvements in policy design and implementation. To this end, many studies have
experimented with, and examined different facets of micro-savings policies. For instance,
Dupas and Robinson (2011) run a field experiment to examine whether access to formal
savings services leads to business growth in poor countries. They find that women saved more
in bank accounts than men. In fact, women took up savings accounts even with negative
interest rates. The rationale they give is that banks offer women a more secure holding of their
savings and make it less vulnerable to theft or loss. On the other hand, they argue that men
were able to save more safely at home than women. This finding suggests that formal savings
providers may achieve higher savings rates if they cater more to women than to men. We can
extend this question to the household level by asking if the gender of the account owner has a
similar effect if he or she is the head of that household. I find that the gender of the household
head does affect the likelihood of having a formal savings account – male household heads
are 8.6 percentage points more likely to have a formal savings account, significant at the .01
level 1.
Schaner (2011) looks at the effects of reducing ATM withdrawal fees on take up
of formal savings accounts by men and women. She looks at how people of different genders
respond to withdrawal of transaction costs for formal savings. She concludes that reducing
ATM fees increased savings rates (by 40%) for accounts owned by men, but reduced savings
rates (by a negligible/insignificant percentage) for accounts owned by women. Men save
1

See Table 4 Column 1
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higher amounts when transaction costs are low, but there aren’t any increases in savings of
women. This implies that the frequency of transactions of men’s savings accounts might be
more than women’s. Therefore, women might take up savings accounts to have a secure place
to store money but use less ATM withdrawals. This hypothesis is corroborated by Dupas,
Robinson, Green, and Keats’ findings in an experiment conducted in Kenya (2012). In a
sample of 840 individuals over a period of 10-12 months, they found that the average number
of withdrawals for men was 3.31 compared to only 0.96 for women.
Several other studies have looked at household income, gender of the household
head, education, and expenditures as determinants of savings. Ackah and Acquah inquire
which households use which financial services (in Ghana). They find that the household
head’s age is positively correlated to take up of formal savings. As the household head ages,
he or she is 0.3 percentage points more likely to adopt formal savings. I find a similar weak
effect of age: as the household head ages, he or she is 0.1 percentage points more likely to
adopt formal savings when simply provided access 2. Ackah and Acquah also find that
household size is positive and significant indicator of savings take-up. This finding is
consistent with my results as well. Each additional member in the household increases the
likelihood of having a savings account by 1.2 percentage points, significant at the .01 level 3.
Woodruff and Martinez (2008), on the other hand, look at community level
characteristics as determinants of savings adoption. They find that education and household
assets have a significant impact on the opening of savings accounts in urban households;
while wealth, expenditure, and ownership of agricultural business are significant in the
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opening of savings accounts in rural households. Compared to the lowest schooling group,
household heads with at least 6 years of schooling are 10 percentage points more likely to
open a savings account. Such effect increases marginally with more years of education. The
effect of literacy (measured as the ability to read) in our sample has similar results. For a
household with a literate head, the probability of adopting a formal savings account increases
by 2.4 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. In addition, the marginal effect of every
literate household member is 4.6 percentage points, significant at the .01 level 4. In addition,
Woodruff and Martinez find that business ownership has no significant effect on the
likelihood of opening a savings account. My findings are consistent with this result as well.
Ownership of a business has no significant effect on adoption of a savings account for all
observations4.
Aggarwal and Klapper (2012) comment that less attention is given to savings
constraints in developing or poor economies, which might reduce the efficiency of
microsavings providers. In order to improve the efficiency of microsavings programs, we
need to place a magnifying glass over their current operations and strategies. More efficient
approaches of microsavings can cut operating costs to the organization and boost financial
inclusion amongst poor populations. Mel, McIntosh, and Woodruff (2013) suggest one such
improvement by experimenting with savings collection techniques of National Savings Bank
(NSB) in Sri Lanka. They compare face-to-face deposit collection to a self-deposit lockbox
for formal accounts in rural communities, and provide a cost cutting, more efficient result.
They find that deposit collection through lockboxes increase savings balance when the
lockboxes are placed less frequently (biweekly as opposed to weekly) in rural communities,
4
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which lower operating costs. In addition, they find that frequent face-to-face deposit
collection increases households’ savings in the short run. Similar to these findings, there are a
few guidelines that formal institutions can consider to become more efficient.
Simply expanding formal savings access into unreached poor locations or
promoting formal savings in these areas may not grasp as many customers as a financial
institution might expect. Individual household characteristics might discourage households
from adopting formal savings for different reasons. For example, households with more
salaried adults may choose to adopt because they accumulate more savings, or households
with more dependents may choose not to adopt in order to avoid transaction fees. Therefore, it
is important for financial institutions to take a closer look at the household level determinants
of formal savings adoption. I believe that if formal savings providers are aware of household
characteristics that maximize probability of savings adoption, they might be able to cut down
operational costs by expanding access geared towards households with those characteristics.
While reviewing existing literature in microsavings, most of which is discussed
earlier, I came across several studies that look at the effects of community level and
household level characteristics on the take up and usage of formal savings accounts. I did not,
however, come across a study specifically geared towards identifying common features of
households that become the initial adopters of formal savings. That said, my study pushes the
existing literature forward with this goal – to outline a “bulls eye” household for formal
savings providers. With an explicit answer to “who is most likely to adopt formal savings
account?”, microsavings providers can strategically target households that become their first
customers. I aim to answer this question in a two-fold manner: Who is most likely to adopt
formal savings when simply granted access? And who is most likely to adopt formal savings
5

when exposed to the promotions and informational campaigns of a bank? Answers to these
questions can allow savings providers to expand their services to households with a predicted
savings adoption decision.
One of the purposes of this thesis is to serve the policy makers (governments,
MFIs, development organizations, NGOs, financial institutions, and others) by providing a
benchmark of the “most likely to save” household to target as the savings customer. I refer to
these households as the “initial adopters” of formal savings. These households become the
first customers of formal savings providers when they expand access to new locations. A
detailed understanding of initial adopters is discussed below.
To better understand the dynamic of savings adoption, I use the Revised
Technology Adoption Life Cycle as put forth by Geoffrey A. Moore in Crossing the Chasm 5.
The Technology Adoption Life Cycle translates well into understanding the time-line of
growing savings adoption within a rural community. The model can be used to categorize the
poor households (the “customers” of an MFI) into five groups (Innovators, Early Adopters,
Early Majority, Late Majority, Laggards) and the model places them in order of their
adoption behavior. The life cycle of formal savings adoption, as applied to Moore’s model, is
illustrated in figure 1:

5

A. Moore, Geoffrey. 2002. Crossing the chasm: Marketing and selling disruptive
products to mainstream customers. 3rd ed. Harper Business (HarperCollins Publishers)
Note: Moore’s revised model of the technology adoption is an extension of Everett M.
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovators theory, originally published in 1962. I use Moore’s
revised version of the model because it introduces the concept of “gaps” between each
group of customer, which I believe is essential to highlight the differences in these groups
of adopters.
6

Figure 1: The Revised Technology Adoption Life Cycle, by Geoffrey A. Moore

As we move from the left to right along the bell curve, the area under the curve
represents the population that takes up savings 6. Innovators are the first small group to
adopt savings; Early adopters are the next group to adopt savings; Early majority is the
next large pool of households to adopt savings; and Late majority and Laggards follow.
As the first to adopt a new product or service, Moore writes that Innovators are
new technology enthusiasts -“they seek them out even before a formal marketing program has
been launched”. In our experiment, Innovators are poor households who will adopt formal
savings simply when provided access, without receiving any marketing or awareness about
the benefits of savings. These households become the first customers of OIBM’s new banking
service.
Early adopters are the individuals who are most likely to respond positively to
marketing and promotions of the new technology. Moore identifies them as individuals who
“find it easy to understand, and appreciate the benefits of a new technology”. In our study,
6

Moore explains the gaps between each group of customer based on the fact that each
group has different needs and wants. He suggests product improvements in order to
“jump” to acquire next customer group. For the purpose of this paper, however, we will
restrict ourselves to the understanding of who the “initial adopters” are and where they
stand on the savings adoption life cycle. We will not discuss how we need to alter
features of formal savings to meet the desired requirements of each group.
7

early adopters are the households who are most likely to adopt formal savings accounts when
told about its features and benefits. They provide the first positive responses to the marketing
campaigns of financial institutions – be it awareness programs, public meetings, in-person
information sessions, etc. In our experiment, the treatment is this exposure to the marketing
and informational campaigns provided by the OIBM bank. Therefore, the early adopters in
our sample are households that adopted formal savings due to treatment.
The next three groups Early Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards ask for much
more than information before promising commitment. In our study, the Early Majority are
poor households that do not trust the financial institution immediately. They require time and
feedback from others around them to adopt savings themselves. They Late Majority
households will take even more time and additional confirmation on the new technology to be
convinced of its worth. Lastly, Laggards consists of poor households that choose not to adopt
savings for personal, social, or economic reasons. They are not responsive to any marketing
or promotional strategies and do not buy into the technology.
A closer look at household characteristics can provide a clear idea of what group
the household falls into. In this paper, I aim to identify households that fall into the innovators
and the early adopters groups of formal savings. I call these two groups the initial adopters of
formal savings. In addition to identifying the initial adopters group of households, I also take
a look at how household characteristics affect the likelihood of owning a savings account, and
the amounts saved in those accounts. Further, I also contribute to the existing literature in this
field by including specifics of the household composition previously overlooked. These
include the number of adults, the number of dependents, and the literacy amongst all
household members.
8

I believe that it is important for savings providers to exclusively cater to the initial
adopters of formal savings because they are their first promising pool of customers. The
innovators adopt savings account without any marketing or promotional demands, thereby
making it a low cost effort for the savings provider to reach out to them. The early adopters
can give savings providers “their first big break” and “gain exceptional visibility” in a
community, as worded by Moore. Especially amongst poor communities, it has become
important for institutions to establish trust and popularity in the community to gain traction.
Targeting the initial adopters of formal savings can reward institutions with both.

9

II. Empirical Setting and Sample Data

The data for this study is pulled from household surveys held in Malawi over two
years, 2008 and 2010. The field evidence was run by the Opportunity International Bank of
Malawi (OIBM) and funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 7. Considering the fact
that households in the research area were far from formal banking services, OIBM spurred an
intervention by driving a “bank on wheels” closer to these households. A mobile van-bank
made six stops at trading centers across the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central
Malawi, bringing reachable access to formal savings to a sample of over 2,000 households.

Figure 2: Individuals make transactions at
the van bank service provided by OIBM.

Figure 3: One of the six stops of the van
bank service provided by OIBM.

Photo credit to Jeffrey A. Flory

Photo credit to Jeffrey A. Flory

In the first part of this section, I will introduce you to Malawi – its population and
economic statistics. In the second part of this section, I will walk you through the details of
the sample data and the methodology of this data collection. In the last part, I will define the
variables included in this study.
7

Field evidence was collected in collaboration with Wadonda Consult, the survey team in
Malawi that collected data, and the IRIS/FSA team (at the University of Maryland, MD)
that reviewed the data.
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Malawi’s bleak economic status puts a dent on its social development but makes
it an attractive destination for a microfinance analysis. Malawi ranks high on the “World’s
worst economies in 2012” by Forbes and the “World’s worst economies in 2013” by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Malawi is one of the most densely populated and poorest
developing countries in the world. Being landlocked, Malawi is neither blessed with a
commercially productive geography nor has it significantly developed its institutions to spur
economic growth. Consequentially, per capita GDP and poverty statistics are not in favor of
the country:

GDP (USD Billions)

Per capita GDP (USD)

2008

4.278

288.078

2010

5.397

343.454

2014

4.178†

237.344†

Table 1.1: GDP and per Capita GDP estimates for Malawi, for the years 2008, 2010, and 2014.
†
IMF staff estimates. Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF Data and Statistics

Given that Malawi’s population is on the rise, the IMF estimates that the per
capita GDP might decline in future years. Within the two years of the panel data collected for
this study (2008-2010), the per capita GDP of Malawi has increased by 19.22%, thanks to the
positive increase in population accompanied by a positive increase in GDP. Unfortunately, the
country’s GDP growth and population are not expected to go hand in hand. In 2014, the IMF
estimates the per capita GDP to decrease by 30.89% compared to 2010. Currently, more than
half of Malawi’s population lives under the poverty line (defined at PPP US$1.25 per day).
According to 2010 the Human Development Report by the United Nations, 66.7%
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of Malawi’s population falls under the poverty line 8. The same report states that the Human
Development Index (HDI) and the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of Malawi were
0.413 and 0.334 respectively, placing it under the Low Human Development list of countries.
This implies that in 2010, when the household survey collection concluded, Malawi ranked on
the lower end for life expectancy, education, and standard of living. The low ranking of
Malawi comes with no surprise given that food shortage, corruption, increasing population,
and HIV/AIDS infection are prevalent conditions of the rural regions.
The issues discussed above not only affect the economic health of Malawi as a
nation, but also affect the ability of poor households in Malawi to rise above the $1.25 per day
poverty line. Let us predict the future of these households with the ongoing economic and
social trends in Malawi. According to the Central Intelligence Agency report (2013), 65.3%
of the population in Malawi is aged between 0-24years and the median age of the entire
population is 17.3. We are, therefore, looking at a nation with a strong, young labor force.
This can prove to be a blessing to the economy of Malawi, but a curse to the status of each
individual household. On one hand, more youth can provide more productive labor on
agricultural fields and more produce available for trade, thereby increasing the value of
expected GDP for the country. In fact, Malawi’s President Joyce Banda, in an interview with
the Wall Street Journal (2012), said that she wants the country’s economic foundation to
move from aid to trade, leveraging on the agricultural produce of the country’s labor. On the

8

Human Development Report. in United Nations Development Programme [database
online]. 2013 Available from www.hdr.undp.org. The HDI is based primarily on
international data from the United Nations Population Division, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics
(UIS) and the World Bank.
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other hand, a heavier young population is expected to boost population growth. According to
the 2010 estimates, the mean age of a mother at first birth is 18.9 and according to the 2013
estimate, there is an average of 5.26 children born to each woman. These statistics indicate
increasing household sizes in the near future in Malawi.
Such demographic forecasts are worrisome because increasing household size
can thwart savings as having more children creates more financial dependence, at least in the
initial years. Further, Malawi’s domestic economy is not enough strong to foster
entrepreneurial ventures or business development within poor households. According to the
latest Enterprise Surveys (2009) in the Business Environment Snapshot for Malawi conducted
by the World Bank, access to finance is the main obstacle in starting a business in Malawi. In
fact, the report states that 40.1% of firms have a line of credit or loans from financial
institutions. Therefore, microfinance intervention has become a stent to the flow of liquid
savings and loans in Malawi.

13

i. Sample and Data Collection

Malawi is divided into three regions: Northern, Central, and Southern. This study
restricts itself to the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central Malawi. The focus of
this paper’s analysis looks at the household-level patterns of savings. 46% of the households
surveyed come from the Dedza district, 30% from the Mchinji district, and 24% from the
Lilongwe district. The following table provides some comparative insights into these districts:

Poor Population 9

Ultra-Poor Population3

Average Household

(2005)

(2005)

Size (2008)

Mchinji

59.60%

30.40%

4.7

Lilongwe

37.50%

11.70%

4.5

Dedza

54.60%

20.90%

4.3

Table 1.2: Poor population statistics for districts of Central Malawi.
Source: Malawi National Statistical Office, Integrated household survey, 2004-2005

As mentioned earlier, the data consists of over 2,000 household surveys
conducted at baseline February to April 2008 and endline February to April 2010. It is
important to note that this time period was the pre-harvest “hungry” season during which
revenues from agricultural activities might be low and vulnerability to food shocks might be
high. About 93% of the sampled households engage in farming, 66% of which also raise
livestock and 44% work as wage laborers. Over 97% of the sampled households participated
9

Poverty Line defined at MWK 16,165 (USD 146.28) per person per year, and Ultra
Poverty Line defined at MWK 10,029 (USD 90.76) per person per year, by the National
Statistical Office of Malawi. Currency conversion rates for 2005 [1 MWK = approx.
0.009049 USD].
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in survey interviews, which lasted between 1.5 to 2.5 hours. The same households were
interviewed in both years, and no monetary incentive or gifts were offered for the interview.
The survey instrument was a 30-page structured questionnaire focused on household
demographics, economic activities, poverty status, food security, asset ownership, salary, use
of financial services, shocks experienced in the past, insurance mechanisms, and social
capital. The questionnaire was translated into the local language Chichewa, and then back into
English as well to confirm accurate translation. Some sources used to design the questionnaire
were the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys and USAID food-security
questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed by the IRIS Center at University of Maryland
as part of an impact assessment of the OIBM’s “bank on wheels”. The bank brought its
services closer to the villages by making weekly stops at six trading centers in the research
area.

Figure 4: The map+ illustrates the route of the van bank service provided by OIBM. The red
triangles represent an approximate location of the six stops. +Created with Google Maps

The data was collected in order to analyze the impact of banking services
provided by the Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM) in the rural parts of
15

Malawi. At the baseline, households in the research area had very low rates of financial
inclusion. Only 11.55% of the 2,451 sampled households had at least one formal savings
account, and about 14.7% of the sample reported using a formal savings account, formal loan,
or both. To address this issue, OIBM provided financial services (formal savings and credit
options) through a mobile van-bank which drove closer to sampled villages, bringing banking
closer to households. Each of the six bank stops was made on the same day of every week,
usually the “market day” so that individuals could conveniently deposit cash earned from
sales the same day.
Amongst the Mchinji, Lilongwe, and Dedza districts of Central Malawi, the data
was collected in units of 2-4 village clusters called “Enumeration Areas” (EAs). A total of
118 EAs were sampled. The Enumeration Areas were categorized by distance from the
mobile van-bank (under 5 km, 5-10 km, or 10-12 km) and by population (high or low).
Following this categorization, at least two EAs were randomly sampled from each populationdistance group. Data sampling was divided based on a matched-pair design, where one
member of each pair was randomly assigned to community-level information-treatment, and
the other member was assigned to the control group. In total, 59 village clusters were
randomly assigned to the treatment group, and an equal amount to the control group. To
minimize spill-over effects from information-treated areas to non-treated areas, the sample
was scrutinized to maintain a minimum distance of 3 km between the two EAs in any pair.
Finally, within each treatment village cluster, the intervention coordinators randomly chose
households to interview. This randomization consisted of writing each household’s number on
a piece of paper, folding it up, dropping it into a bag, and having a member of the community
draw blindly from the bag. The interview was held at both baseline and endline, and followed
16

the questionnaire designed by the IRIS center.
During the two year gap between the baseline and endline (April 2008 to March
2010), OIBM adopted a Randomized Encouragement Trail technique to provide intensive
marketing and awareness of its financial services to the treatment group in the sample 10.
Marketing techniques involved radio, public meetings, and “personal marketing” where
information was delivered to clients’ doorsteps. OIBM and the IRIS center designed
information campaigns that explained the terms, conditions, and application processes of
opening savings accounts to the randomly assigned treatment. Promotional materials also
included t-shirts, fliers, posters, and referral cards. Village clusters that were assigned
treatment were exposed to these promotional campaigns, and village clusters in the control
group were not provided any promotional information. In section VII, we will examine how
such campaigns altered the effect of household characteristics on the probability of savings
adoption by differentiating between the effects of control and treatment groups.

10

For a complete report on the awareness and marketing techniques, please refer to:
Nagarajan, Geetha, and S. Ademan. "Does Intense Marketing Increase Outreach? The
Case of Opportunity International Bank in Rural Malawi." College Park, MD: IRIS
Center, Assessing the Impact of Innovation Grants in Financial Services Project (2010).
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ii. Data Description: Variables in focus

I use a linear probability model to analyze the effects of household characteristics
on the probability of the adoption of a formal savings account. The data set used for this study
includes a broad spectrum of variables: from use of credit or adoption of savings, to past
experiences with food or health shocks, to individual and household level demographics. For
the purpose of this paper, I restrict my analysis to inclusion of the following variables:

Y i = α 0 + α 1 (Gender) i + α 2 (Age) i + α 3 (Age2) i + α 4 (Married) i + α 5 (Literacy) i +
β 1 (Salaried members) i + β 2 (Literate members) i + β 3 (Business) i + β 4 (Distance) i +
β 5 (Cellphone) i + ϒ 1 (Adults) i + ϒ 2 (Children) i + ɛ
Table 1.3: Regression Equation

The list of independent variables included in this equation is mostly consistent
with the literature examining formal savings. However, I extend the analysis by adding
additional variables (such as literacy of the entire household), and disaggregating the
household size variable.
The dependent variable is the use of a formal savings account. A “savings
account” refers to any device used by the household to store monetary savings. At the
location studied, households have several options to store their cash. In this study, I
include the use of “formal” savings at any organization, including the five commercial
banks (OIBM, National Bank, Standard Bank, NBS Bank, First Merchant Bank), the twopara-statal banks (Malawi Rural Finance Company and Malawi Savings Bank), the
savings and credit cooperatives, and the NGOs in the area. Other “informal” savings
18

options include storing cash at home, at a relative’s place, or in a Rotating credit and
Savings Association (ROSCA). At the baseline, only 11.5% sampled households held
formal saving accounts, while at the endline this number rose to 16.5%.
In addition to the use of formal savings, I will also analyze the effects of
household characteristics on the amount saved in these formal accounts. This accounts
for the second dependent variable included in this study. It would be interesting to see if
the same household characteristics show different effects on savings adoption and on the
amounts saved. This might raise interesting questions regarding adoption and savings
behavior, which are discussed in sections V and VI.
I focus on three categories of household characteristics in this study. First, I
include variables pertaining to the household head (Gender, Age, and Married). These
variables can affect the household’s decision to adopt savings, and the amount of savings
in that account as well. Several other studies have looked the effect variables on the
adoption and usage of financial services (Dupas, Robinson, Green, Keats (2012); Schaner
(2011); Ackah, Acquah; Woodruff, Martinez (2008); Prina (2013)). These variables are
shown as α 1 (Gender) i , α 2 (Age) i , α 3 (Age2) i , α 4 (Married) i , and α 5 (Literacy) i in Table
1.3. The Gender variable takes the value 1 for male household heads and 0 for female
household heads. The Age variables reflect the expected diminishing effect of the
increasing age of the household head. The Married variable takes the value 1 for married
household heads and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the literacy variable refers to the ability of a
household head to read Chichewa, which takes the value 1 if the ability holds true.
Second, I include variables pertaining to all household members, not necessarily
to the head. To account for the wealth of a household, I include a continuous variable for
19

the number of household members who are salaried, a dummy variable for ownership of
at least one business, and a dummy variable for the ownership of a functional cellphone. I
believe that these three characteristics highlight the wealth level of a household because
we can expect wealthier households to have salaried members, at least one business, or a
functional cellphone. On the other hand, the poorest of the sampled households might not
exhibit any of these three characteristics. For instance, at the baseline, only 13.09% of the
sampled households have a working cellphone, indicating that a majority of the sample is
too poor to afford them. Further, of the 2461 sampled households, 73.69% do not own
any businesses, and 22.24% own one business, and the remaining 4.07% own two to four
businesses. Lastly, I include a distance variable to demonstrate the convenience of having
formal savings options at arm’s length, or the inconvenience of having it far away.
Third, I include variables explain the household size. To look at the household
composition as a determinant of savings adoption, I divide the household size into Adults
and Children. These are shown as ϒ 1 (Adults) i and ϒ 2 (Children) i in Table 1.3. The
adults are aged above 17 and are assumed working. The children are aged 17 or below
and are assumed financially dependent. I find that it is important to split household size
into number of adults and number of children in order to accurately understand that
effects of household literacy and household size within our sample. This rationale is
discussed further in the section III.
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III. Effects of Household Size and Literacy
The importance of splitting up household size into number of adults and number
of children

A few studies have analyzed the effects of household size on the adoption or
usage of financial services, be it formal or informal savings, though the results have been
ambiguous (Ackah, Acquah; Prina (2013); Cole, Sampson, Zia (2011)). For instance,
Ackah and Acquah find that household size has a positive and significant effect on the
use of formal financial services. On the other hand, Prina (2013) finds that the estimated
effect of household size is negative (but insignificant) on the take-up of savings, and
negative and significant on usage of savings accounts. Through this study’s findings, I
believe that breaking up the composition of household size into number of adults and
number of children gives a clearer picture of how the variables affect savings.
Table 2 compares the effect of splitting up household size into adults and
children, with different literacy variables at the baseline. Column 1 shows the effect of
splitting the household size variable into number of adults and number of children. Here,
the literacy variable is a dummy (with value 1 if anyone in the household can read) that
considers the literacy of any one individual in the household. Each additional adult in the
household increases the likelihood of having formal savings by 1.8 percentage points
(significant at the .05 level), and each additional child increases the likelihood by 1.1
percentage points (significant at the .05 level). These results are similar to the effect of
household size taken as an aggregate variable, shown in column 2. Results show that
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household size increases the likelihood of having a savings account by 1.27 percentage
points, significant at the .01 level.
However, when I change the literacy variable to a continuous variable that
accounts for the increase in number of household members who can read, the effects are
in sharp contrast. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 illustrate these two effects. First, column 4
shows that household size has a negative and statistically insignificant effect on the
probability of savings. If household size increases by one member, the probability of
having formal savings decreases by 0.55 percentage points. Second, column 3 shows that
number of adults has a negative yet statistically significant effect. For every additional
adult in the household, the probability of having a savings account decreases by 2.7
percentage points, significant at the .05 level.
In Table 2, the continuous literacy variable in columns 3 and 4 accounts for the
marginal effect of adding literate members into the household, as opposed to the dummy
literacy variable in columns 1 and 2 which does not. By accounting for the literacy of all
household members (and not just one member, as in columns 1 and 2), we notice two
important effects. First, every additional literate adult in the household increases the
likelihood of savings by 5.49 percentage points, significant at the .01 level. This might
suggest that the more members in the household who can read, the more people who can
understand and go through the process of opening a formal account. Second, every
additional adult in the household (literate or not) reduces the likelihood of savings by 2.7
percentage points. This might be the case because increasing the number of adults living
under one roof, despite their ability to read Chichewa, may put more strain on earnings as
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expenditures may increase. There might be more burden on expenditures if each
additional adult in the household is not earning or spending more than he or she earns.
Another important point to consider is that if we compare columns 2 and 4 in
Table 2, we can see the effect of household size alter significantly as we change the way
in which we control for literacy. In column 2, if we consider a dummy variable for
anyone in the household who can read, the household size has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of having a savings account If a household has at least
one member who can read Chichewa (this could be the household head as well), the
probability of having a savings account increases by an estimated 1.27 percentage points,
significant at the .01 level. This result is consistent with Ackah and Acquah’s finding that
household size increases the chances of having a savings account by a positive and
statistically significant effect, when we account for the literacy of only one member in the
household (in their case, the household head). However, when I change the literacy
variable to a continuous one (accounting for every additional literate household member),
the effect of the household size becomes negative and statistically insignificant. This
underlines a concern that Ackah and Acquah’s finding might have been due to an omitted
variable bias of not accounting for all household members’ literacy. It might be possible
that if they had included a literacy variable for the entire household, the magnitude and
statistical significance of the household size might have fallen to a negative effect.
Following the same path, let us look at the effects of different literacy variables
on the estimated magnitude and significance of the effect of number of adults and number
of children in a household. Columns 1 through 6 in Table 3 illustrates the effect of
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changing literacy variables on the significance of household size variables (number of
adults and number of children). In particular, pay attention to the changes in effects of
number of adults and number of children as we change the literacy variables.
As we look across the results in columns 1 through 6, we notice three important
patterns. First, all literacy variables are statistically significant in their respective
regressions. Second, number of adults and number of children have a positive effect for
dummy literacy variable regressions. Third, number of adults and number of children
have a negative effect for continuous literacy variable regressions.
For regressions with a dummy literacy variable, there is an increase in the
likelihood of having formal savings if anyone in the household can read Chichewa. The
literacy variable is a dummy; therefore, it will take the value 1 if at least one member in
the household can read Chichewa. Despite additional members being able to read
Chichewa, the dummy variable keeps a value of 1. Therefore, increasing the number of
adults who are literate does not affect the literacy variable. Due to the correlation
between the literacy and household size variable, the negative effect of increasing the
number of individuals under one roof is not captured by either variable. This hints at an
omitted variable bias which occurs due to the absence of a continuous variable to capture
the literacy of all household members. This may justify the positive effect of both literacy
and number of adults variables (as seen in columns 1, 3, and 5).
For regressions with a continuous literacy variable, as we increase the number of
adults who can read Chichewa, the literacy variable captures a positive effect on the
probability of having a savings account. For every additional literate member in the
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household, the likelihood of having a savings account increases by a positive and
significant number in columns 2, 4, and 6. In these columns, as we increase the number
of literate adults, we are also adding more people to that particular household. Columns
2, 4, and 6 capture two outcomes of adding members to a household. First, increasing
number of literate adults increases the probability of savings (by the statistically
significant coefficient of the literacy variable). This may be explained on the basis that
more members in the household should be able to open formal savings for the entire
household because they can read through the necessary documentation and process.
Second, increasing the number of adults decreases the probability of savings (by the
statistically significant negative coefficient of number of adults). One rationale behind
this effect is that increasing the number of adults increases household size, which might
increase expenses and lower the probability of having formal savings.
In conclusion, the regression in column 6 represents an appropriate combination
of literacy and household variables applicable to this study. All other variables previously
mentioned (including cellphone, business ownership, distance from the EA, etc) will be
added into this regression for analysis. Since this paper is looking at the composition of
the entire household, I include literacy variables that show the ability of all members in
the household to read Chichewa. In a case where members of the household (other than
the household head) can read Chichewa, they may be able to better understand the
benefits of savings through the bank’s marketing campaigns. These members can in turn
influence the household head to adopt savings. But, if the household head can read
Chichewa in the first place, he or she might want to adopt savings without the influence
of other household members. If the household head can read Chichewa, there is an
25

“added plus” to the probability of the take up of savings. Therefore, I include a
continuous variable for the number of literate members in the household (except the
head) and a dummy variable Literacy of the household head.
I use a linear probability model to analyze the effects of various household
characteristics on the likelihood of already having formal savings, the probability of
adopting formal savings (post treatment), and on the amounts saved in formal savings.
Y i = α 0 + α 1 (Gender) i + α 2 (Age) i + α 3 (Age2) i + α 4 (Married) i + α 5 (Literacy) i +
β 1 (Salaried members) i + β 2 (Literate members) i + β 3 (Business) i + β 4 (Distance) i +
β 5 (Cellphone) i + ϒ 1 (Adults) i + ϒ 2 (Children) i + ɛ
Table 1.3: Regression Equation

As shown above, the regression equation includes three categories of independent
variables:
•

Characteristics of the household head: age, gender, marital status, and literacy.
These variables are preceded by coefficients α 1, α 2, α 3, α 4, and α 5 .

•

Non-head characteristics of the household: number of salaried members in the
household, number of literate members in the household, ownership of business,
distance from EA, ownership of a cellphone. These variables are preceded by
coefficients β 1, β 2, β 3, β 4, and β 5. .

•

Household size: number of adults, number of children. These variables are
preceded by coefficients ϒ 1 , and ϒ 2 .
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IV. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings

Across the baseline (2008) and the endline (2010) in Table 4, we can see a range
of similarities and differences amongst independent variables and the probability that a
household owns a savings account. Let us take a closer look in the three categories of
regressors. Table 4 reports the likelihood of having a formal savings account at the
baseline (2008) and at the endline (2010) as determined by household characteristics.
Characteristics of the household head
In Table 4, the effect of the household head’s age on the probability of having a
savings account is negligible in 2008 and 2010. Although in 2010 the estimated effect of
age is higher than the effect in 2008, the coefficients are not statistically significant. This
result is in contrast with Ackah and Acquah’s finding that the effect of the age of the
household head on using formal financial services is positive and statistically significant.
I find that the effect is indeed opposite; negative and not statistically significant in both
2008 and 2010. Ackah and Acquah also note that in Ghana, the sampled average age of
household heads with formal savings is 47. I find that the mean age of individuals with a
formal savings account in Malawi is 42, which underlines a difference in our sample data.
On the other hand, the gender of the household head has notably different effects
in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, if the household head is male, the probability of having a
savings account increases by 8.6 percentage points. This result is statistically significant
at the .01 significance level. The finding that male headed households are more likely to
have a formal savings account is consistent with other literature in the field of
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microfinance 11. As illustrated in figure 3, 94.7% of the households that owned a savings
account were male headed in 2008, and 90.8% of them were male headed in 2010.
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Figure 5: Sampled household heads’ gender ratios for 2008 and 2010

The gender ratio is similar in the sample for both years, tipping more towards
male headed households. A male headed household is a positive predictor of owning a
formal savings account in the sample. One reason behind male household heads being
more inclined towards formal savings (as opposed to informal savings) is that formal
savings allows them to exercise self-discipline on temptation expenditures. If there is a
cost attached to formal savings withdrawals, men who tend to spend “cash in hand”
11

Ackah and Acquah find the male household heads were 0.7 percentage points more
likely to use formal financial services.
Ackah, Charles, and Adjoa Acquah. Which households use which financial services?
Evidence from Ghana.

Dupas, Green, Keats, and Robinson find that amongst unbanked individuals, men were
3.9 percentage points more likely to open an account compared to women.
Dupas, Pascaline, Sarah Green, Anthony Keats, and Jonathan Robinson. 2012.
Challenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya's Western Province.
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might reduce their expenditures 12. Note that this particular regression shows that male
headed households were more likely to have a formal savings account, but does not
necessarily comment on the usage or amounts saved in these accounts. Therefore, it is
possible that more households with male heads have accounts, and at the same time, more
households with female heads have higher savings or frequency of deposits and
withdrawals. If this is the case, male heads who opt for formal savings with an aim of
saving more and spending less, do not stick to that aim. We will further examine the role
of gender in take up of savings account and the actual amount in sections V and VI.
The magnitude of the effect and significance of the gender variable differs across
the baseline and the endline. The probability of a household having a savings account
was higher for households headed by a male in both years, the effect being positive and
significant in 2008, and being positive and not significant in 2010. In 2010, if the
household head is male, the probability of having a formal savings account increases by
1.2 percentage points. This result is not statistically significant. The same effect is almost
12

"These constraints are often such that fees or restrictions on access to liquidity may
actually help increase storage of savings. First, individuals may have to contend with
time inconsistent preferences - if the temptation to spend out of readily accessible savings
is too great, individuals may prefer to store resources in an account that is costly to
access" (Banerjee and Mallainathan 2010; Laibson 1997).
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2010. The Shape of Temptation:
Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor.
Laibson, David. 1997. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112 (2): 443-78.
Prina (2013) agrees: "A fully liquid account might have advantages and disadvantages
for the poor. On the one hand, poor households might value a savings that is fully liquid
so that they can dip into their savings to address a shock. On the other hand, liquidity
might be an obstacle for those exercising self-control.”
Prina, Silvia. 2013. Banking the poor via savings accounts: Evidence from a field
experiment. Case Western Reserve, Working Paper.
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7 times more in 2008, significant at the .01 level. One rational behind this sharp
difference in the effect of gender might be explained by the contribution of treatment
effects. The informational campaigns provided to treated households (included in 2010,
but not in 2008) might have been more successful in female headed households. We will
discuss the effect of treatment on gender effects in section VII.
Further, the ability of the household head to read Chichewa has a positive effect
across the baseline and the endline. However, if the household head can read Chichewa,
the probability of having a saving account increases by a higher percentage in 2010 than
in 2008. In 2008, the household head’s ability to read Chichewa increases the probability
by 5.7 percentage points, while in 2010, it increases the probability by 8.6 percentage
points. Both these results are statistically significant (at the .01 level) and are in
agreement with Woodruff and Martinez’s findings on literacy. In a sample of 3472
observations, Woodruff and Martinez (2008) find that the likelihood of having an account
is 31.6 percentage points higher if the head had 12+ years of schooling and 13.7
percentage points higher is he or she could speak the indigenous language. Woodruff and
Martinez’ results are statistically significant at .01 level as well.
Non-head characteristics of the household
The ability of the household members to read Chichewa has a similar effect in
both years. One reason that the ability of household members to read Chichewa might
matter is that the bank’s awareness program would be most effective if an individual can
read about the benefits of savings and can go through the necessary documentation
required to open a savings account. If there are several members in the household who
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can read Chichewa, it shows the household’s investment in education, which in turn can
account for higher salaries and savings. In addition, it is safe to assume that the savings of
a particular household are managed by its head; therefore the literacy of the household
head is very important. In a case where members of the household (other than the
household head) can read Chichewa, they will understand the benefits of savings through
the bank’s marketing campaigns. These members can in turn influence the household
head to adopt savings. But, if the household head can read Chichewa in the first place, he
or she might want to adopt savings without the influence of other household members. If
the household head can read Chichewa, there is an “added plus” to the probability of take
up of savings. The results corroborate this notion. The effect of household head’s ability
to read is a statistically significant and positive, on top of the effect of the household
members’ ability to read Chichewa.
At the baseline and the endline, the effect of each additional member who can
read Chichewa is positive and significant at the .01 level. For every additional member in
the household who can read Chichewa, the probability of having a savings account
increases by approximately 3 percentage points. This result may suggest that as we
increase the number of literate members in the household, we increase the likelihood that
the household will respond positively to the financial knowledge and the benefits of
financial savings. In addition, it hints at the household’s investment in education 13. We
can expect such a household to use a savings account in order to save for education
investment. This fact is corroborated by two explanations: first, a plausible assumption
13

Prina (2013) found that as the poor open savings accounts, their investments in health
and education increases.
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that the ability to read Chichewa would lead to a better understanding of savings benefits
and second, Shawn, Thomas, and Zia’s finding (2011) that financial literacy promotes
asset accumulation.
Along the same path, ownership of a working cellphone has similar effects in
2008 and 2010. With both coefficients bring statistically significant, the probability of
having a savings account increases by approximately 25 percentage points if the
household owns a cellphone in working condition. Given the high percentage effect, this
variable is an important predictor of the household’s use of a savings account.
I expect that owning a business gives the household another reason adopt savings
– to accumulate savings and invest in the business. Therefore, I expect the correlation
between this variable and savings to be positive. Aggarwal, Klapper, & Singer (2012)
also find that poor households opt for microcredit for expansion of existing businesses. In
areas where microcredit is not as accessible, poor households are motivated to save in
order to expand their businesses. It is interesting to note that if the household owns a
business, the effect is positive and significant in 2008 (at the .1 level), but negative and
not significant in 2010 on the probability of owning a savings account. At the baseline,
the result is consistent with other findings (Woodruff, Martinez (2008); Cole, Thompson,
Zia (2011)) 14. Households open accounts to save for future investment or expansion of

14

Woodruff and Martinez (2008) find that if the account holder owns an agricultural or a
non-agricultural business, his or her probability of having a savings account
increases by 5.2% and 5.6% respectively. These results statistically significant.
Woodruff, Christopher, and José Martínez. 2008. Assessing changes in household
access to financial services in Mexico: An analysis of the BANSEFI/SAGARPA
panel survey 2004 -2007. (Footnote continued on next page…)
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their existing business. What affects the amounts actually saved in these accounts is
discussed in the next section.
At the endline, however, we see that business ownership has a negative and not a
significant effect on the probability of having a savings account. In 2008, 99 households
who owned at least one business had a formal savings account. This number reduced to
96 in 2010. This drop could have been due to several reasons. Perhaps, some households
chose to opt out of formal savings or increased their expenditures more and opted out of
savings overall. Further, once the bank went mobile and more accessible at the end line,
having a business might not matter as much in determining the usage of formal savings.
In 2008, 35% of the banked households had a business, and in 2010, 27% of the banked
households had a business. This drop in the number of banked households with a
business suggests that once the bank went mobile, and came closer to the villages, all
households (regardless of business ownership) had easier access to savings. Whereas,
initially when the bank was not mobile, we can assume that wealthier households (i.e.
households with businesses) could make the trip to the bank for savings. Once the bank
went mobile, the effect of business was no longer statistically significant, and in fact,
quite close to zero.

Cole, Sampson, and Zia find the ownership of a non-farm enterprise increases the
probability of the household owning a formal bank account. This result is positive
and statistically significant for the sample in Indonesia. Cole, Shawn, Thomas
Sampson, and Bilal Zia. 2011. Prices or knowledge? What drives demand for
financial services in emerging markets? The Journal of Finance 66 (6): 1933-67.
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Household Size
In context of household size, I expect the correlation between the number of
adults to the probability of savings take up to be positive, because the more the number of
adults, the more earning hands in the household, and thus the higher the probability of
savings. On the other hand, I expect the same correlation in the case of number of
children to be negative because the more the dependents in the household, the more the
expenses, and the less the probability of savings. The results how that the number of
children has a negligible and statistically insignificant effect on the probability of having
a savings account both at baseline and at endline. However, the effect of the number of
adults differs in 2008 and in 2010. In 2008, the effect of having more adults in the
household is negative and statistically insignificant, but in 2010, the same effect is
positive and significant.
In 2008, before OIBM started a van-bank drive, poor households in the research
area may not have had easy access to financial services due to far distances from the bank
site. Financial services do not reach out to every village and members of a poor
household would have to travel by foot to go to the bank. In this case, households with
more adults may not choose to make the inconvenient and time consuming walk to a
bank branch. Further, if a household has high number of adults, they may not want a
savings account far from them because they want their savings to be within their reach.
We can expect that the more the adults in a household, the more the consumption of cash.
Therefore, if a household with more adults held a savings account, they would require
routinely transactions to meet their consumption. That said, a household with more adults
might choose to keep cash at home or at a relative’s place. By keeping cash within reach,
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these households not have the inconvenience of traveling to a make a bank deposit or
withdrawal far away from their village. Therefore, if a household has more adults, they
might accumulate their savings at home and feel a much lesser need for a formal savings
account that is at a far distance. This behavior might explain the negligible and
insignificant effect of number of adults on the probability of having a savings account at
the baseline. Having more adults in a household may not matter at the baseline because
the bank branch is too far to store savings.
By 2010, however, OIBM was providing banking services much closer to the
household’s reach. Through a van bank that made six stops at trading centers, OIBM
literally drove people’s savings deposits closer to their village. The convenience of
having a bank closer to the village allows for routinely transactions and deposits.
Households with more adults can open a savings account and make transactions much
faster. For a household with more adults, the incentive to open a savings account was not
only the convenience of the bank, but also the promise of security from theft or loss. That
said, the more the number of adults in a household, the more the likelihood of one of at
least the members making an occasional trip to a trading center (a stop for the van bank).
Therefore, adults who travel to run errands occasionally might be incentivized to open a
savings account. Or, if these individuals were unaware of the van-bank, they might
happen to stumble upon OIBM’s van bank services, and bring the information of this
accessible bank back to their household. In either case, the more the number of adults in a
household, the more the chances of having a formal savings account. Hence, at the
endline, we see that each additional adult in the household increases the probability of
having a savings account by 2.8 percentage points, significant at the .01 level.
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V. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and
Amounts Saved at the Baseline
Table 5 compares the effect of various household characteristics on the likelihood
of having a formal savings account to the actual amount saved (conditional on having
formal savings) at the baseline. Note the difference in the number of observations. It
shows that 278 households out of the 2395 sampled at the baseline report having a formal
savings account.
Characteristics of the Household head
The ability of the household head to read Chichewa has a positive effect on the
probability of having a savings account (with significance at .01 level), but a negligible
effect on the amount saved. If the household head is literate enough to read, he or she is
more likely to better understand the procedure of opening and using a savings account.
Shawn, Thomas, and Zia (2011) find that across India and Indonesia, households exhibit
an increase in demand for financial products with an increase in financial education. It is
intuitive to expect that the ability to read or to have a basic education background may be
important to comprehend financial education, and as a result, opt for financial products.
However, our sample suggests that the ability to read is often not strong enough by itself
to provoke the use of financial services. The evidence lies at the baseline, where 69% of
the sampled household heads can read Chichewa, but only 11.55% of them have a formal
savings account. This brings us to microfinance literature which suggests that several
other social issues, such as lack of trust in the organization, unmet documentation
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requirements or other factors might thwart even a literate household from choosing to
have a savings account (Aggarwal, Klapper (2012); Dupas, Robinson (2009); Cole,
Sampson, Zia (2011)) 15. These might help explain why only 283 households having a
savings account at the baseline when 1697 households have a literate head in the sample.
The gender and the marital status of the household head have different effects on
the probability of having a savings account than on the amount saved. If the household
head is a male, the household is 8.6 percentage points more likely to have a savings
account, significant at the .01 level. However, amongst formal account owners, the
significance of being a male household head disappears for the actual amount saved. This
relates to past literature in microfinance looking at which gender saves more. There have
been contradicting findings related to gender, mostly because several other factors
besides gender affect savings amounts. Dupas & Robinson (2009) find that the average

15

Aggarwal and Klapper write that unbanked individuals in developing countries might
not opt for formal savings accounts due to lack of money, high costs of opening the
account, distance from the bank, documentation requirements, or lack of trust in the
institution.
Aggarwal, Shilpa, and Leora Klapper. 2012. Designing government policies to expand
financial inclusion: Evidence from around the world. Unpublished Working Paper, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Dupas and Robinson find that savings accounts offered by savings cooperatives are not
readily available because they are urban and employment based.
Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson. 2009. Savings Constraints and Microenterprise
Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya.
Cole Shawn, Sampson Thomas, and Bilal Zia also discover in their experiments in India
and Indonesia that financial literacy alone does not increase demand for financial
products in the greater population.
Cole, Shawn, Thomas Sampson, and Bilal Zia. 2011. Prices or knowledge? What drives
demand for financial services in emerging markets? The Journal of Finance 66 (6): 193367.
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deposits for women were twice as high as the average deposits for men. Women (all of
whom were market vendors) used their accounts more actively as well. On the contrary,
in another study, Dupas, Keats, Green, and Robinson (2012) find that men had higher
amounts in total and average savings deposits. We can infer that although gender might
be an important determinant of who saves more, it is dependent on the circumstances
(employment, social constraints, household size, etc) that affect gender’s role in
determining the amount saved.
Lastly, marital status of the household head has a positive and significant effect
on the amount saved. If the household head is married, he or she may feel more
responsible the family, including the dependents in the household. This behavior might
encourage him or her to save more, thereby explaining the positive effect. One evidence
for such behavior can be pulled from Dupas and Robinson’s field experiments in Kenya
2009). Dupas and Robinson find that “having a joint account with spouse” has a positive
effect on the “take-up and usage of a savings account” for both men and women.
Therefore, households with married heads are more likely to save higher amounts in their
savings accounts.
Non-head characteristics of the household
As seen in Table 5, the effect of number of members who can read Chichewa is
positive and significant for both dependent variables. As an indicator of literacy, the
ability to read may also imply that the household understands the financial benefits of
saving. Hence, a household is more likely to save if more members can read. Also, the
higher the number of household members who are salaried, the more the expected inflow
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of income, and thus, the higher the expectation for savings. The effect of each additional
salaried member in the household increases the likelihood of savings by 9.2 percentage
points, significant at .01 level. Similarly, it increases the amounts saved by 14,531
kwacha ($103.27), significant at .05 level 16. The effect of ownership of a business flows
along the same path. If a household owns at least one business, the probability of savings
increases by 2.6 percentage points, significant at the .1 level. Note that the amount of
savings is most affected the ownership of a business enterprise. If a household owns a
business, its savings are boosted by 33,285 kwacha ($236.55), significant at the .05 level.
These results are statistically significant and consistent with other studies 17.
The effect is similar if someone in the household owns a working cellphone: the
probability of having a savings account increases by 26.2 percentage points (significant at
.01 level) and the amount saved increases by 8,238 kwacha ($58.54). Given that the
effect of having a functional cellphone is compelling, this result is useful for
microfinance institutions that operate through mobile banking. Ownership of a working
cellphone not only increases the possibility of having a savings account (thereby boosting
financial inclusion) but also increases the amounts of savings in those accounts. On

16

Currency conversion based on the exchange rate in April 2008. 1 MWK = 0.
0.007107068 USD
17
Cole, Sampson, and Zia find that demand for commitment savings increases by
approximately 1 percentage point if the household owns a non-farm enterprise. This
result is not statistically significant. In addition, they also find the ownership of a nonfarm enterprise increases the probability of the household owning a formal bank account.
This result is positive and statistically significant for the Indonesia sample, and positive
and not significant for the India sample.
Cole Shawn, Sampson Thomas, and Bilal Zia: Prices or Knowledge? What Drives
Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets? The Journal of Finance, Vol. LXVI
#6 (December 2011)
39

challenge, however, in mobile banking amongst poor households is that only a limited
number of individuals own cellphones in working conditions. In our sample, only 13.09%
of the households own a cellphone that is functional.
Household Size
As discussed in section IV, the effect of having more adults in a household lowers
the probability of having a savings account because of the cost of convenience. However,
if a household already owns a savings account in 2008, the effect of having more adults
under one roof is positive and not significant on the amount saved in that account. One
rationale behind this finding is that the more the number of adults, the more labor in the
household, and the more earnings we can expect. This would increase the amounts saved
by the household in the savings account. This analysis brings about an interesting finding
that the effect of each additional child within the household decreases the amount saved
in the savings account by a 5923 kwacha (USD 42.09), significant at the .01 level. Since
we expect children in these households to be dependent and non-earning, it is expected
that their survival would drain out the savings of the households. Therefore, we can
account for the negative effect on the amount saved.
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VI. Household Determinants of Having Formal Savings and
Amounts Saved at the Endline

This analysis compares the effect of household characteristics on the probability
of having a savings account, and on the actual amount saved (conditional on having a
savings account) at the endline. Table 6 compares the effects of household characteristics
on the likelihood of having a formal savings account and the amount saved in those
accounts, at the endline. Note that observations in both columns of this table include the
treatment groups (those exposed to the informational campaigns of the bank) and the
control groups (those who did not receive any marketing). Table The fact that column 2
only has 330 observations implies that at the endline, only 330 observations reported
having a formal savings account. Compare this statistic to the number of observations in
column 2 of Table 5 in section V. At the endline only 278 households reported having
formal savings, while at the endline, this number rose to 330 (including both treatment
and control groups).
Characteristics of the Household head
Amongst the variables focused on the household head, the gender and ability to
read Chichewa present the most interesting results. If the household head is male, the
probability of having a savings account is more, but the amount saved in the account is
less. However, both these results are not statistically significant. Further, if the household
head can read Chichewa, the household is more likely to have a savings account (by 8.6
percentage points, significant at the .01 level) but less likely to have high amounts of
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savings. Compare this result to column 1 in Table 5 of section V. We see a similar effect
of the literacy variable in both 2008 and 2010. This may imply that literacy can be an
important variable in understanding the importance of savings and going through the
procedure of opening an account. However, given that the staple Malawian occupation is
agriculture, it is possible that the ability to read Chichewa is not as useful as other factors
(such as labor efficiency, energy, etc) in generating a larger inflow of agricultural
income. Therefore, while literacy may predict the likelihood of having saving account, it
might not increase the actual amount saved in the account.

Non-head characteristics of the household
Some characteristics of a household have a similar effect on the probability of
having a savings account and on the amount saved. These include number of members
who are salaried (positive and not significant), number of non-head members who can
read Chichewa (positive), and distance from the bank (negative). Most importantly, if the
household owns a cellphone in working condition, it is 25 percentage points more likely
to have a savings account and expected to have 19,440 MWK more in savings. Both
these results are statistically significant at the .01 level.
On the other hand, ownership of a business has different effects on each of the
dependent variables. If a household owns at least one business, it is 0.9 percentage points
less likely to have a formal savings account, but on average, has 8,315 MWK more in
savings if it already owns an account. Both these results, however, are not statistically
significant.
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Household Size
In context of the household size, the number of children in the household does not
significantly affect either of the dependent variables. For each additional child in the
household, the probability of having a savings account increases by 0.1 percentage points
and the amount saved in an account increases by 765.9 MWK (approx. 5.07 USD) 18. On
the contrary, number of adults has a contrasting effect. For every additional adult in the
household, the probability of having a savings account increases by 2.8 percentage points
(significant at the .01 level) but the amount saved decreases by a statistically insignificant
value of 2,614 MWK (approx. 17.31 USD).
This implies that the number of adults in a household matters more for predicting
the likelihood of having a savings account than predicting the amount saved by a
household, conditional on having an account. Note that this result at the endline is
opposite of the result we came across at the baseline. At the baseline, number of adults is
a positive (yet, not statistically significant) predictor of the amount of savings. This
difference in effect may be explained by the accessibility of the bank. By 2010, the bank
went mobile and became more accessible, which could be an excuse for easier and faster
withdrawals. Therefore, the more the number of adults in the house, the more the number
of individuals who could access a savings account to withdraw money. Thus, having
more adults in the household could have brought more amounts into savings account
when the bank was less accessible, but it may have caused more withdrawals when the
bank went mobile. It is important to keep in mind that these results are not statistically
18

Currency conversion based on the exchange rate in April 2010. 1 MWK =
0.0066225166 USD
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significant in either 2008 or 2010 (see columns 2 of Table 5 and Table 6), and therefore
might not be truly representative of actual behavior. That said, there is room for future
research to test the significance of the number of adults variable as it differs at the
baseline and at the endline.
Summary of section V and VI Results
The results of sections V and VI draw a distinction between variables that matter
to achieve more financial inclusion and variables that matter to encourage the poor to
save more amounts. Table 1.4 summarizes the most important variables that are positive,
ranked in order of the magnitude of their effect:

2008
(Baseline)

Household characteristics that
increase the probability of having a
savings account

Household characteristics that
increase the amount saved in
the savings account

1. Ownership of a functional
cellphone***
2. Number of salaried members***
3. Gender of household head is
male***

1. Household owns a
business**
2. Household head is
married**
3. Number of salaried
members**
1. Ownership of a functional
cellphone***

2010 (Endline) 1. Ownership of a functional
cellphone***
2. Household head can read
Chichewa***
3. Number of members who can read
Chichewa***

Table 1.4: Comparison of household determinants of having formal savings and the amounts saved, at the
baseline and at the endline. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, and ** indicates significance at the
5% level.

Table 1.4 shows the characteristics of households who are most likely to be
financially included (with formal savings accounts), and households that use these
accounts to save the most amount. It draws a distinction between the focus of financial
44

inclusion to get more individuals to open savings accounts, and the focus of encouraging
poor households to save money in those accounts. This information might be useful for
microfinance institutions that research the behaviors and saving patterns of poor
households.
In summation, I conclude that a household with a functional cellphone is most
likely to have a savings account; a household with a business and a married head is likely
to save the most; at the baseline (2008), a household with the highest number of salaried
members has the high probability of having a savings account, and the most amounts of
savings as well; and lastly, at the endline (2010), a household with a functional cellphone
has the high probability of having a savings account, and the most amounts of savings as
well.
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VII. Household Determinants of Adopting Formal Savings

This section compares the effect of variables on the probability of adopting a
formal savings account i.e. the determinants of whether a household (which did not own a
savings account at the baseline) will have adopted a savings account at the endline. Table
7 table illustrates the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of adopting a
formal savings account. The analysis is split into three regressions; First, I will discuss
the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption for all 1,828 observations that
did not own a savings account in 2008. This includes both the treatment and the control
groups, as shown in column 1 of Table 7.
Second, I will discuss the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption
for households in the control group. In this case, the household characteristics affect
savings adoption in absence of any marketing and awareness campaigns of OIBM
banking services. However, they still had access to the newly introduced van bank
service. Column 2 shows that 940 households were not exposed to the marketing efforts
of OIBM. If you recall the Technology Adoption Life Cycle curve discussed in section I,
it shows that such households are the “innovators” in adoption of formal savings. These
households do not need to be targeted by the bank to provide any marketing or awareness
of the financial service. They are the first ones to adopt formal savings regardless.
Third, I will discuss the effect of household characteristics on savings adoption
for households in the treatment group. In this case, the household characteristics affect
savings adoption differently. The marketing and awareness campaigns of OIBM banking
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services alter the effect of household characteristics on its savings adoption decision.
Column 3 shows that 1,828 households were exposed to the marketing efforts of OIBM.
Given that these households choose to adopt formal savings when targeted by the
marketing campaigns, they are the early adopters of microsavings.
The difference between the treatment and the control effects should exhibit the
“added effect” the OIBM banking marketing outreach on the household’s decision to
adopt a formal savings account. To estimate this difference, I run another linear
probability regression with household variables interacted with a dummy treatment
variable “T”. The revised regression equation for testing the results of treatment is shown
in Table 1.5:
Y i = α 0 + α 00 T + α 1 (Gender) i + α 11 (Gender) i *T + α 2 (Age) i + α 22 (Age) i *T + α 3
(Age2) I + α 33 (Age2) i *T + α 4 (Married) i + α 44 (Married) i *T + α 5 (Literacy) i + α 55
(Literacy) i *T + β 1 (Salaried members) i + β 11 (Salaried members) i *T + β 2 (Literate
members) i + β 22 (Literate members) i *T + β 3 (Business) i + β 33 (Business) i *T + β 4
(Distance) i + β 44 (Distance) i *T + β 5 (Cellphone) I + β 55 (Cellphone) i *T + ϒ 1 (Adults) i
+ ϒ 11 (Adults) i *T + ϒ 2 (Children) i + ϒ 22 (Children) i *T + ɛ
Table 1.5: Regression equation for variables exhibited in Table 7. *T indicates interaction of household
characteristics with the treatment variable. The coefficients of these variables exhibit the “added effect” of
treatment on that household determinant of savings.

One of the purposes of this paper is specifically to identity the initial adopters of
formal savings. Column 3 in Table 7 shows that regardless of the household
characteristics, the exposure to the marketing of OIBM’s savings services increases the
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probability of savings adoption by 8.25 percentage points amongst the group of treated
households. Although this result is not statistically significant, it may imply that the
awareness of OIBM’s new van bank service can have a positive effect on poor
households’ decisions to open savings accounts. In other words, had OIBM bank not
provided any promotional campaigns for its van bank, and had silently continued driving
the van bank service closer to villages, the adoption rate could have been quite lower.
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i. Identifying the Innovators

Column 2 in Table 7 lists the effects of household characteristics for observations
that may choose to adopt formal savings provided by the new van bank service, without
receiving any informational campaign. Households from the control group that choose to
adopt savings are the innovators. Characteristics of such households are discussed below:
Characteristics of the household head
Column 2 shows that household head’s literacy carries the most significance (at
the .05 level) amongst this category of variables. If the household head can read
Chichewa, the household’s inclination to adopt savings is estimated to increase by 5.09
percentage points. This may imply that if a household head can read Chichewa, he or she
may be able to open a formal savings account without any help from OIBM bank’s
promotional assistants and coordinators. A literate household head may be able to reach
out to the bank, read through the required documentation, and open an account without
any assistance in understanding basic bank requirements.
Results show, without significance however, that female household heads are
more likely to adopt formal savings in the control group. Further, if the household head in
the control group is married, the estimated increase in the probability of savings adoption
is 0.5 percentage points, with no statistical significance.
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Non-head characteristics of the household
With each additional member in the household who can read Chichewa, the
probability of adopting formal savings increases by 1.9 percentage points, significant at
the .1 level. This may be the case because the more literate adults under one roof, the
more people who can go through the documentation and the process of opening an
account without any promotional help, or at least assist the household head in doing so.
Further, if someone in the household head owns a cellphone, the probability of adopting a
savings account increases by approximately 10 percentage points, significant at the .05
level. This may be an important finding for banks as they could potentially expect
households with a functional cellphone (or with the wealth level to afford a working
cellphone) to be their first customers.
As the number of salaried household members increases, we can expect a positive
increase in the probability of savings adoption (by 4.7 percentage points). One rationale
behind this result might be that households with more salaried members may be
motivated to store all their savings in one secure location, regardless of a formal bank
informing them of their services. This result, however, is not statistically significant.
Similarly, the effect of owning a business is small and not statistically significant in the
control group. If a household owns at least one business, it is 1.1 percentage points more
likely to adopt formal savings without the bank approaching them personally. On the
other hand, the effect of distance holds significance. The closer the household to the
bank, the higher the probability that it will adopt formal savings without receiving any
promotions. In our sample, households closer to the trading center might stumble upon
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the van bank service being offered, and as a consequence, may choose to open an
account.
Household size
In terms of household size, results show that with every additional adult in the
household, the probability of savings adoption increases by 3.5 percentage points,
significant at the .05 level. If a household has more adults, it may have more chances of
coming across the ban services without the bank specifically reaching out to the
household head. In our sample, the more the number of adults in a household, the more
the chances that one of those adults came across the van bank service at one of the
trading centers. Thus, it is possible that banks can expect households with more adults to
reach out to their services. On the other hand, the effect of having an additional child in
the household increases the likelihood of savings adoption by a negligible and
statistically insignificant value.
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ii. Identifying the Early Adopters

The coefficients of the interaction variables in Table 7 Column 3 exhibit the
“added effect” of marketing banking services on the decision to adopt formal savings.
Results of this added effect are illustrated by the interaction variables of household
characteristics and the treatment variable. A majority of these results in column 3 do not
hold enough significance to accurately represent the actual effect of marketing on
household characteristics. This opens room for future research on finding the added effect
of marketing on adoption decisions with statistical significance. In this section, I will
discuss the effects of treatment by drawing attention to the magnitude of variables in
focus. Although the lack of significance does not cement an accurate definition of the
early adopters, nonetheless, it gives us an idea of what an estimated early adopter looks
like.
The treatment variable by itself implies that despite the household characteristics,
simply providing treatment (exposure to the awareness of OIBM banking services)
increased the likelihood of an unbanked household adopting a savings account by
approximately 9 percentage points. The characteristics of an early adopter household are
discussed below:
Characteristics of the household head
Exposure to marketing and awareness of bank services damps the effect of
increasing age of a household head. Results show that as the household head gets older,
exposure to the bank’s marketing efforts may reduce the probability of formal savings
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adoption by 0.22 percentage points. This implies that a bank may be better of reaching
out to younger household heads. For example, a household head aged 30 is
approximately 22 percentage points more likely to adopt formal savings than a household
head aged 40, when exposed to the bank’s promotions.
We can see a similar effect of treatment on the effect of gender. Providing a male
household head with exposure to a bank’s marketing services increases his likelihood of
savings adoption by 2.09 percentage points. This result may indicate that male household
heads may not be as willing to reach out to the bank independently as female household
heads, and may require information on the benefits and process of opening formal
savings.
Note that treatment also reverses the effect of the literacy variable. If a household
head can read Chichewa, he or she is approximately 5 percentage points more likely to
adopt formal savings, significant at the .05 level. Reaching out to these households, as
part of a marketing or promotional campaign, lowers this effect by approximately 1
percentage point. This result may suggest that banks may be better off allocating
resources to provide information and assistance to household heads who cannot read
Chichewa. Lastly, if the household head is married, the added effect of treatment is 1.5
percentage points. These effects lack the significance to be estimated as a characteristic
of an early adopter.
Non-head characteristics of the household
Treatment has an added positive effect of 0.82 percentage points for each
additional member in the household who can read Chichewa. It may be the case that
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members who can read Chichewa can better understand the informational sessions
provided by OIBM, or can better respond to the marketing efforts of OIBM. Therefore, as
more literate members in a household are exposed to treatment, the higher the probability
of savings adoption.
While the effect of treatment on the literacy variable is quite low, its effect on the
ownership of a cellphone is high. If a targeted household owns a cellphone, it is 9.96
percentage points more likely to adopt savings when provided access, significant at the
.05 level. If we provide treatment to such a household, the probability of savings adoption
increases by 12.2 percentage points, significant at the .10 level. Therefore, if banks
provide access and marketing to households in which someone owns a functional
cellphone, they boost the likelihood of formal savings adoption significantly by 22.16
percentage points.
Household Size
In context of household size, if a household is exposed to the awareness programs
of the bank, the effect of having an additional child decreases the probability of savings
adoption by 0.8 percentage points. Given the negligible and insignificant value of this
result, it is ambiguous how the number of children in a household alters its adoption
decision upon receiving marketing from the bank. On the other hand, for every additional
adult in the household, the likelihood of adopting a formal savings account increases by
1.3 percentage points in the treatment group. One takeaway from these results is that the
magnitude of adults interacted with treatment is higher than the magnitude of children
interacted with treatment. But the significance of both variables it too weak to make an
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expectation that formal savings promotions can negatively affect the adoption decisions
of bigger households.
Summary of section VII results
Based on the estimated results in Table 7 Column 3, an early adopter, or a
household most likely to adopt formal savings due to the marketing efforts of a bank has
a functional cellphone, and may have a small size, a young, male head who cannot read
Chichewa, and adults who can read Chichewa. Apart from the predicted effects of
cellphone ownership, this estimation calls for further research and confirmation in
significance.
Compare this “early adopter” household to an “innovator” household. Both
groups are similar in the fact that households own a functional cellphone and that nonhead members can read Chichewa. The fact that ownership of a functional cellphone
boosts the probability of savings adoption (for both control and treatment groups)
concludes that households with a functional cellphone are most likely to be the intial
adopters of formal savings.
In conclusion, based on the differences between the characteristics exhibited by
the innovators and the early adopters, banks are most likely to acquire customers when
they provide access to households that have a head who can read Chichewa, a functional
cellphone, more adults who can read Chichewa, and are closer to the bank center. On the
other hand, banks may be more cost and time efficient in their marketing efforts if they
target their marketing efforts towards smaller households with a young, male head, who
owns a functional cellphone.
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VIII. Conclusion

In order to broaden their reach with a promising rate of financial inclusion,
microsavings programs should understand three aspects of the poor households they
serve: who these households are, why they save, and how they save. This paper takes the
first step in that direction – identifying who these households are (at least two groups of
them – the innovators and the early adopters). Organizations might be tempted to employ
an aggressive drive to reach out to all households with the same promotional strategy at
the same time. However, the results might not be promising. For instance, Ramji (2009)
finds that an expansion of formal savings to unbanked households in the Gulbarga district
of India had an insignificant impact, despite an aggressive drive to maximize financial
inclusion. At the end of the drive, 70% of the sample still remained unbanked. In
addition, results show that the accounts were opened by individuals who had pre-existing
savings accounts.

Achieving financial inclusion in any given community takes time and a strategic
approach. Financial institutions must acquire households group by group (innovators,
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and finally, laggards), retain commitment by
catering to specific savings needs, and grow until they reach their desired financial
inclusion goal. The first step in that direction is identifying who the initial adopters are. In
this paper, we identified the innovators and the early adopters of formal savings households that are the first customers of microsavings. The innovators group of
households adopted formal savings accounts at the new van bank simply when OIBM
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expanded access closer to their villages. On the other hand, the early adopters group of
households adopted formal savings accounts at the new van bank when OIBM expanded
access accompanied by an informational campaign in their village. Based on the
definitions of these two groups, a bank can save time and cut down marketing expenses
by not targeting the innovators, and instead gearing the promotional campaigns towards
the early adopters.
My results show that the following characteristics boost the probability of a
household willing to adopt formal savings simply when granted access to the service:
household head can read Chichewa; someone in the household owns a functional
cellphone; households consists of adults who can read Chichewa; and the household is
close to the bank. With this information, a formal savings provider can grasp an idea of
who to expand access to in order to acquire more customers.
Following the group of households mentioned above, who adopt savings simply
when provided access, early adopters are the next big pool of customers that a financial
institution serves. I find that households in the early adopters own a functional cellphone,
which increases their likelihood of savings adoption significantly when exposed to a
bank’s promotions. However, since results for other characteristics are only suggestive of
what an early adopter household could look like, there is room for additional research on
accurately identifying the early adopters of formal savings. One way to identify the early
adopters could be to run a similar field experiment, where the treatment is exposure to the
marketing campaigns of a bank’s services, followed by an examination of the differences
in household level determinants of formal savings adoption. In addition, similar research
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can identify the initial adopters of informal savings, credit, insurance programs, and other
services of microfinance institutions. For organizations that provide a range of services to
the poor, information on the initial adopters or individuals for each of those services can
broaden the breadth of their reach. Lastly, some results in this paper are only suggestive
of actual household behaviors and offer avenues for further research. For example,
section VI poses a question to see how the number of adults within a household affects
the amounts in formal savings accounts when the bank is driven closer to the household.
Once the initial adopters have been identified, microfinance institutions can take
strategic measures to approach these individuals in a way that maximizes probability of
adoption. Research on the interaction between a bank agent and a household can provide
answers to a broad array of questions. For instance, how does the gender of the financial
organization’s information provider affect a household head’s decision to take up
savings? Does a specific milieu of interaction (be it through public meetings, one on one
interaction in the household, group interaction at the bank, etc) increase the likelihood of
savings adoption? As economists and social entrepreneurs, such questions are crucial to
ask because they can improve the efficiency of microsavings efforts. For the populations
of poor who want to save but are waiting for access, formal savings services might be
their springboard to rise above poverty. The process of expanding financial services to
poor households may be sensitive to several factors; the more we are aware of them, the
more we can maximize chances of financial inclusion for every poor household.

****
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Table 2: Results of splitting the household size with changing literacy variables

VARIABLES

Age
Gender
Number of salaried
members
Ownership of business
Number of literate
members (dummy)
Number of adults
Number of children

(1)
Has savings
(2008)

(2)
Has savings
(2008)

(3)
Has savings
(2008)

(4)
Has savings
(2008)

0.000564
(0.000499)
0.0490***
(0.0151)
0.177***
(0.0368)

0.000680
(0.000491)
0.0518***
(0.0147)
0.177***
(0.0366)

0.000133
(0.000489)
0.0592***
(0.0145)
0.150***
(0.0308)

-0.000207
(0.000499)
0.0493***
(0.0142)
0.152***
(0.0314)

0.0569***
(0.0147)
0.0829***
(0.0119)

0.0575***
(0.0147)
0.0848***
(0.0117)

0.0500***
(0.0145)

0.0488***
(0.0143)

0.0181**
(0.00910)
0.0113**
(0.00440)

Household size

-0.0274**
(0.0105)
-0.00221
(0.00432)
0.0127***
(0.00383)

Number of literate
members (continuous)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0549***
(0.00650)

-0.00558
(0.00408)
0.0500***
(0.00592)

-0.137***
(0.0244)

-0.137***
(0.0243)

-0.0253
(0.0258)

-0.0341
(0.0255)

2,395
0.087

2,395
0.087

2,395
0.126

2,395
0.124

Notes: This table compares the effect of splitting up household size into adults and children, with different
literacy variables at the baseline. Column 1 includes number of adults, number of children, and a dummy
variable for household literacy (1 if anyone in the household can read Chichewa). Column 2 includes the
household size, and a dummy variable for household literacy (1 if anyone in the household can read
Chichewa). Column 3 includes number of adults, number of children, and a continuous variable for
household literacy (adding on the value of each member who can read Chichewa). Column 4 includes the
household size and a continuous variable for household literacy (adding on the value of each member who
can read Chichewa). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table 3: Effect of literacy variables on the magnitude of household size variables

VARIABLES
Age
Gender
Number of salaried
members
Ownership of Business
Number of literate members
(dummy)
Number of adults
Number of children

(1)
Has savings (2008)

(2)
Has savings (2008)

(3)
Has savings (2008)

(4)
Has savings (2008)

(5)
Has savings (2008)

(6)
Has savings (2008)

0.000564
(0.000499)
0.0490***
(0.0151)
0.177***
(0.0368)

0.000133
(0.000489)
0.0592***
(0.0145)
0.150***
(0.0308)

0.000438
(0.000499)
0.0557***
(0.0152)
0.176***
(0.0361)

-0.000122
(0.000504)
0.0739***
(0.0149)
0.156***
(0.0313)

0.000911*
(0.000489)
0.0290*
(0.0151)
0.168***
(0.0357)

0.000280
(0.000495)
0.0519***
(0.0150)
0.150***
(0.0310)

0.0569***
(0.0147)
0.0829***
(0.0119)

0.0500***
(0.0145)

0.0564***
(0.0149)

0.0535***
(0.0145)

0.0526***
(0.0147)

0.0491***
(0.0145)

0.0181**
(0.00910)
0.0113**
(0.00440)

-0.0274**
(0.0105)
-0.00221
(0.00432)

0.0118
(0.00917)
0.00904**
(0.00434)

-0.0266**
(0.0110)
-0.00292
(0.00453)

0.0192**
(0.00893)
0.0126***
(0.00436)

-0.0239**
(0.0111)
-0.000776
(0.00450)

Number of literate members
(cont.)

0.0549***
(0.00650)

Number of literate members,
except the head (dummy)

0.0877***
(0.0154)

Number of literate members,
except the head (cont.)

0.0568***
(0.00760)

Literacy (dummy)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.0498***
(0.00746)

-0.137***
(0.0244)

-0.0253
(0.0258)

-0.107***
(0.0240)

0.00606
(0.0284)

0.104***
(0.0130)
-0.138***
(0.0254)

2,395
0.087

2,395
0.126

2,395
0.094

2,395
0.117

2,395
0.101

0.0767***
(0.0117)
-0.0447
(0.0285)
2,395
0.127

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 Table 3 are the same as columns 1 and 3 in Table 2. All columns include number of adults and number of children, instead of one household size variable. Each column accounts for a
different literacy variable: Column 1 includes a dummy for at least one member who can read, column 2 includes a continuous variable for number of members who can read, column 3 includes a dummy for at
least one member (except the head) who can read, column 4 includes a continuous variable for at least one member (except the head) who can read, column 5 includes a dummy only for the head’s ability to read,
and column 6 includes one continuous variable for number of members (except the head) who can read and a dummy for the head’s ability to read. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table 4: Household determinants of having a formal savings account:
VARIABLES

Age
Age2
Gender
Number of salaried
members
Ownership of business
Literacy
Number of literate
members
Number of adults
Number of children
Marital status
Ownership of cellphone
Distance from EA
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Has savings
(2008)

(2)
Has savings
(2010)

-0.000146
(0.00243)
6.61e-06
(2.68e-05)
0.0868***
(0.0260)
0.0923***

-0.00220
(0.00316)
2.10e-05
(3.28e-05)
0.0127
(0.0361)
0.0386

(0.0233)
0.0261*
(0.0142)
0.0569***
(0.0115)
0.0324***

(0.0279)
-0.00924
(0.0176)
0.0864***
(0.0167)
0.0306***

(0.00583)
-0.0158
(0.00998)
0.00413
(0.00449)
-0.0437
(0.0293)
0.262***
(0.0333)
-0.00452
(0.00318)
-0.00777
(0.0589)

(0.00682)
0.0289***
(0.00990)
0.00159
(0.00516)
-0.000805
(0.0364)
0.252***
(0.0312)
-0.00649*
(0.00366)
0.0481
(0.0788)

2,395
0.197

2,057
0.141

Notes: This table reports the likelihood of having a formal savings account at the baseline (2008)
and at the endline (2010) as determined by household characteristics. The observations at the
baseline and the endline include both the assigned control and treatment households. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table 5: Household determinants of formal savings adoption and amounts saved
at the baseline
VARIABLES

Age
Age2
Gender
Number of salaried
members
Ownership of business
Literacy
Number of literate
members
Number of adults
Number of children
Marital status
Ownership of cellphone
Distance from EA
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Has savings
(2008)

(2)
Amount in account
(2008)

-0.000146
(0.00243)
6.61e-06
(2.68e-05)
0.0868***
(0.0260)
0.0923***

1,480
(1,644)
-15.91
(16.65)
3,021
(8,825)
14,531**

(0.0233)
0.0261*
(0.0142)
0.0569***
(0.0115)
0.0324***

(7,192)
33,285**
(13,578)
97.22
(11,575)
5,608**

(0.00583)
-0.0158
(0.00998)
0.00413
(0.00449)
-0.0437
(0.0293)
0.262***
(0.0333)
-0.00452
(0.00318)
-0.00777
(0.0589)

(2,399)
152.8
(4,448)
-5,923***
(2,243)
19,240**
(8,354)
8,238
(7,358)
-619.2
(814.3)
-40,944
(52,996)

2,395
0.197

278
0.112

Notes: This table compares the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of having a
formal savings account and the amount saved in those accounts, at the baseline. Observations in
column 1 include all households in the sample (except the ones missing for specific variables).
Observations in column 2 include only the households that reported having a formal savings
account. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In column 2, the reported
currency is Malawian Kwacha, where the exchange rate is 1 MWK = 0. 0.0071 USD for the year
2008. . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

Table 6: Household determinants of formal savings adoption and amounts saved at the
endline

VARIABLES

Age
Age2
Gender
Number of salaried
members
Ownership of business
Literacy
Number of literate
members
Marital status
Ownership of cellphone

Distance from EA
Number of adults
Number of children
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Has savings
(2010)

(2)
Amount in account
(2010)

-0.00220
(0.00316)
2.10e-05
(3.28e-05)
0.0127
(0.0361)
0.0386

-215.1
(726.6)
2.561
(7.029)
-2,935
(11,349)
1,725

(0.0279)
-0.00924
(0.0176)
0.0864***
(0.0167)
0.0306***

(6,403)
8,315
(5,769)
-3,169
(3,551)
982.5

(0.00682)
-0.000805
(0.0364)
0.252***

(2,272)
8,505
(9,089)
19,440***

(0.0312)
-0.00649*
(0.00366)
0.0289***
(0.00990)
0.00159
(0.00516)
0.0481
(0.0788)

(6,967)
-623.6
(515.4)
-2,614
(2,272)
765.9
(1,359)
14,801
(19,804)

2,057
0.141

330
0.079

Notes: This table compares the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of having a
formal savings account and the amount saved in those accounts, at the endline. Observations in
column 1 include all sampled households and observations in column 2 include only the
households that reported having a formal savings account. Clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. In column 2, the reported currency is Malawian Kwacha, where the
exchange rate is 1 MWK = 0.0065 USD for the year 2010. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses, adjusted for 118 clusters. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and * at the 10% level.

Table 7: Household determinants of adopting formal savings
VARIABLES

Age

(1)
Has Savings
(2010)

(2/Control)
Has Savings (2010)

4.76e-05
(0.00307)

0.00141
(0.00339)

-7.42e-06
(3.19e-05)

-2.12e-05
(3.55e-05)

-0.0168
(0.0324)

-0.0277
(0.0420)

0.0169
(0.0268)

0.0479
(0.0316)

-0.00393
(0.0177)

0.0116
(0.0244)

0.0468***
(0.0149)

0.0509**
(0.0214)

0.0247***
(0.00732)

0.0194*
(0.0107)

0.0118
(0.0343)

0.00564
(0.0461)

0.169***
(0.0348)

0.0996**
(0.0465)

-0.00571*
(0.00295)

-0.00637*
(0.00364)

0.0276***
(0.0100)

0.0351**
(0.0143)

0.000864
(0.00488)

0.00459
(0.00535)

0.0252
(0.0773)

-0.0208
(0.0830)

1,828
0.074

940
0.065

Age* T
Age2
Age2* T
Gender
Gender* T
Number of salaried members
Number of salaried members* T
Ownership of business
Ownership of business* T
Literacy
Literacy* T
Number of literate members
Number of literate members* T
Marital status
Marital status* T
Ownership of cellphone
Ownership of cellphone* T
Distance from EA
Distance from EA* T
Number of adults
Number of adults* T
Number of children
Number of children* T
Treatment
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(3/Treatment)
Has Savings
(2010)
0.00141
(0.00338)
-0.00226
(0.00617)
-2.12e-05
(3.54e-05)
2.16e-05
(6.33e-05)
-0.0277
(0.0418)
0.0209
(0.0655)
0.0479
(0.0315)
-0.0556
(0.0526)
0.0116
(0.0243)
-0.0321
(0.0350)
0.0509**
(0.0213)
-0.0105
(0.0298)
0.0194*
(0.0107)
0.00826
(0.0148)
0.00564
(0.0459)
0.0151
(0.0692)
0.0996**
(0.0463)
0.122*
(0.0670)
-0.00637*
(0.00362)
0.000876
(0.00606)
0.0351**
(0.0143)
-0.0135
(0.0201)
0.00459
(0.00533)
-0.00824
(0.0101)
0.0908
(0.157)
-0.0208
(0.0827)
1,828
0.079

Notes: This table illustrates the effects of household characteristics on the likelihood of adopting a formal savings account.
Column 1 includes all 1,828 observations (both control and treatment) that did not own formal savings in 2008. Column 2
includes the control group, which was excluded from receiving any marketing of OIBM’s van bank. Column 3 illustrates the
“added effect” of treatment on household characteristics as they affect the likelihood of adopting formal savings. Column 2
represents characteristics of the innovators and and column 3 represents the early adopters. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses; adjusted for 118 clusters in column 1, for 60 clusters in column 2, and 58 clusters in column 3.
***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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